I
On 28 February the US and Israel unleashed a devastating ‘surprise’ attack on Iran. Air and missile strikes killed leading members of Iran’s leadership, hit military bases, command and control centres, depots, bunkers, air defence but also government buildings, hospitals and schools – most notably the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls elementary school in the southern town of Minab, killing 156 civilians, 120 of them young girls.
Three weeks later a Japanese reporter asked Trump why he didn’t inform his European and Japanese allies of the plan to attack Iran. Trump responded the attack was a ‘surprise’ like Japan’s attack on the US naval base Pearl Harbour in 1941. Trump was answering questions in the White House. Sat next to Trump was Japan’s visibly discomfited PM Sanae Takaichi on an official visit to Washington.
The greatest surprise was reserved for the Iranians who thought they were still negotiating with Steve Witkoff (Trump’s golfing buddy and business partner) and Jared Kushner (Trump’s son in law and business partner), running through the minutiae of a nuclear deal. On the war’s first day Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed with other leading personnel of the Islamic Republic.
Reports from the Omani mediated US-Iran Geneva talks reveal Witkoff was out of his depth and didn’t understand Iran’s offer on a nuclear deal: a hiatus on its civil nuclear program for 3-5 years (partly reflecting the reality of damage inflicted by US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities in 2025). On the last negotiating day Witkoff demanded a 10 year lay-off. Two days later the US attacked. Yet Iran had abjured building its own bomb, agreed a full return to IEAA oversight, committed to degrading the 440kg of enriched stockpiled weapons grade uranium and operating fewer centrifuges.
But Washington opposed any enrichment – effectively a ban on any civil nuclear program. In the spirit of ‘know thy enemy’ (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War) Tehran offered the US various commercial partnerships for exploiting their oil and gas in a naked appeal to Trump’s Carbon Id. Though the US tentatively offered the removal of 80% of the US sanctions in place, Witkoff informed Washington he didn’t trust the Iranians. But the bad faith was on the American side. Sensing war was imminent the Omani foreign minister crossed the Atlantic to persuade Trump and Vance a deal was near, aware Witkoff and Kushner weren’t properly conveying Iran’s concessions or commitment to negotiations. War started the following day.
II
After two months its clear the US-Israeli military action is faltering despite their evident military superiority and must count as a failure on its own terms though Trump’s actual objectives in going to war were never entirely clear. Perhaps this is because war was begun on a whim, a swelling sense of US invincibility after the Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro was successfully kidnapped.
US military adventures usually begin with illusions of the invulnerability of American power but this is shadowed by a darker, subterranean presentiment – a will to death or imperial death instinct that would unleash indiscriminate violence displaying what Melanie Klein described as projective identification: unconsciously disavowing unwanted feelings of anger, humiliation, rage, projecting them on to another object or subject and thereby justifying inflicting death on the Other (people elsewhere). Trump’s dog at the Department of ‘War’, the brilliantined, reptilian former Fox TV news anchor Pete Hegseth combines the martial masculinity of the manosphere with millenarian Christian nationalism. MAGA’s ‘isolationist’ credo ‘America First’ is also a restatement of America’s freedom of action unencumbered by obligations to friends and allies – marking something of a psychotic break or disavowal of the complexity of reality. In the early days of success on the battlefield, Trump even claimed military intervention would help revive the revolt that previously threatened clerical rule before it was brutally crushed. It’s doubtful Trump believed his own fable (rarely aired publicly since). What’s clear is the US and Israel entered war while negotiations were ongoing exemplifying what Paths and Bridges described elsewhere as malign decisionism in action: in this case pushing a lever to launch the world’s most powerful military machine; a move the Narcissist-In-Chief, with Netanyahu’s encouragement, found simply irresistible.
Since 28 February Trump has serially declared victory or an end to the conflict. At a rally in Kentucky on 11 March Trump declared: “Let me say, we’ve won.” On the White House lawn on 20 March Trump said: “I think we’ve won.” Four days later Trump said in the Oval Office: “We’ve won this war.” The day after he told a fundraiser “we are winning so big.”
Yet despite Trump bloviating triumphalism, reality has interrupted with Iran’s refusal to surrender as energy and commodity supply shocks continue to reverberate globally. Nonplussed with Iran’s refusal to cave, Trump has raged issuing chilling threats to send Iran to the “stone ages.” The US’s strategic problem is underscored by the ‘Trump effect.’ Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize winning Keynesian economist observed Trump’s “jawboning” in the conflict’s early weeks (declaring a US victory or an imminent negotiated settlement), helped dampen energy price rises. But too many such pronouncements recalled Groundhog Day and their effectiveness has diminished.
Krugman suggests the war and its energy shocks show the importance of energy security (diversifying energy sources) and transitioning to renewables. Trump is unintentionally reinforcing the case for a green energy revolution. For Krugman there are greater problems in the pipeline. Though 20% of global oil supply passed through the Strait of Hormuz there was initially no short term danger of an oil shortfall (though Asia acquired a greater proportion of their oil from the Gulf and were more economically integrated into the region). Spiking prices reflected future supply concerns. When Iran was first attacked oil supplies were already at sea (on delivery so to speak). There was a brief grace period – Krugman thought 4 to 6 weeks (he was posting a month after the war’s start). Therefore if the war didn’t end soon there would be crunch point in April when 20% of missing global oil supply would finally be felt.
Some shortfall could be covered by releasing reserves or increasing supply elsewhere. The US eased sanctions so India could buy more Russian oil. But diminishing supply would still see prices rise. China has insulated itself from Gulf energy supplies in recent years (building reserves, buying from South America and Russia, pushing ahead with the renewable energy revolution) but 6% of supply still came from the region – not negligible for the world’s biggest manufacturing economy. According to Krugman a prolonged energy shock could still send the world economy into a tailspin.
The war’s actual course has reinforced a sense Trump isn’t fully in control of events with a concomitant loss of US authority: no longer a reliable, stable partner. This doesn’t mean Iran is ‘winning’ – the Islamic Republic is in a parlous state and remains deeply vulnerable to further destruction of its civilizational infrastructure. But the war is patently not following Washington’s expectations. One indicator of this is the debate on the end of the US dollar’s supremacy as the world’s reserve currency of choice (a port in a storm). Premature? Probably. The dollar’s value rose at the war’s start indicating the dollar’s appeal as a safe haven. Yet the debate itself reflects anxieties about the US’s trajectory. Are foreign treasuries, banks and investors considering dumping some of their dollar holdings? China holds a staggering $3.42 trillion in reserves which is estimated to equal 70% of China’s overall reserves. China overhauled Japan as the biggest overseas holder of US securities in 2014. As China’s development swiftly proceeded discussion about the wisdom of such ‘dollar dependency’ pointed to the danger of financial volatility and dollar depreciation. Yet the advantages of being the US’s prime creditor currently outweigh such concerns. Even so China’s share of US debt started to fall slowly from 2021 onwards.
Trump is caught on his own hook. He was persuaded by Trump Whisperers like Netanyahu and the echo chamber of his court the clerical regime only needed a push to collapse. A year before the war Trump hosted the alt-right wingnut Laura Loomer in the Oval Office. Loomer advised purging various staffers and advisors as not loyal to the MAGA brand. Recently one of those staffers Nate Swanson warned an Iran under attack would shut down the Strait of Hormuz (or the ‘Gulf of Hormuz’ as Witkoff prefers). In truth this wasn’t an example of sharp strategic acumen but shows Trump’s coterie have been selected in a process favouring deference (and mendacity) to the top dog with expertise and specialised knowledge winnowed out. Unpleasant thugs like Stephen Miller have been elevated, Marco Rubio diminished further and reduced to a shadow of his former shadow. Few former POTUS’s would have been persuaded war on Iran would be a virtually cost free win-win.
Iran has displayed intransigence and refusal to surrender but also been greatly weakened while the gravest threat it faced to its survival was the domestic revolt in its towns and cities that were suppressed with grim brutality. Trump’s military action, the threats to destroy bridges, desalination plants, electricity generating capacity – Iranian civilization in fact – expose his hypocritical support for the people’s rebellion. Apocalyptic American threats – destroy the village to save the village – are unlikely to have helped political opposition to the regime.
At the time of writing (20 April) Trump was to send VP Vance back to Islamabad to continue negotiations but Tehran – mistrustful of the Americans and aware of the leverage derived from the global energy shocks – was in no hurry to resume talks. A chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz has proven an effective card given the absence of the dubious benefits of an Iranian bomb. Without downplaying the dangers the ruling regime faces (internally and externally), Tehran clearly understands the benefits of generating global economic pain.
The war’s course can be read as the latest example of the surprises thrown up by asymmetric conflict. Firstly, we have again seen the limits of US military power and, perhaps, secondarily the senescence of an imperial colossus whose tentacles spread from Rome on the Potomac. But the US as hegemon and military empire remains powerful and truly global in scope. The US has 750 known bases throughout the world in 80 different countries (those openly acknowledged). A 2022 Stockholm Institute of Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) study reported the US accounted for 39% of arms spending (this was 3.5% of US GDP or $877 billion). Trump is now proposing an eye watering hike in US defence spending in 2026 of $1.5 trillion, the largest spending increase since the Second World War (this includes a proposed Golden Dome missile defence system).
A widely reported aspect of the perversities of this asymmetric conflict is its ‘missile math.’ Reports suggest the US only has 25% of its global Patriot missile battery needs (shortfalls were the real reason the US stopped sending the battery to Ukraine rather than Trump’s cool sentiment towards Kyiv). The US can only build 650 Patriot batteries annually. Some Patriot missiles were fired last year countering Iran’s performative ballistic missile retaliation on US Gulf bases. When the US-Israel embarked on war, Iran was estimated to have 3,000 ballistic missiles stockpiled. The US’s stunning early successes, virtually casualty free, can’t obscure that its sophisticated arms are finite and expensive. In contrast Iran’s relatively cheap missile and drone stock are simple but plentiful. A single Patriot interceptor costs $4m. A whole battery costs over $1bn while a typical Iranian drone costs $35,0000. A single Tomahawk cruise missile costs between $2m to $3.6m and though Iranian ballistic missiles are far more expensive than its drones (between $1m and $2m) 2 to 3 Patriot missiles are required to shoot them down.
In the post-war decades the potency of US military power was enhanced by its network of allies – a reality eluding Trump’s understanding. Recent attacks on NATO assume the US would be more effective as a unilateral force. Yet much of the post-war security architecture of the Liberal Leviathan (John Ikenberry) including mutual defence of overseas allies, was simply the first line of defence (and offence) of the US homeland. During the Cold War it might have appeared gauche to talk of an American empire given US power largely rested on its sheer economic dynamism while Washington championed political liberalism and democracy but the democracy at home was flawed, disfigured by the legacy of slavery and racism, and the US state wasn’t averse to overthrowing democracies elsewhere and supporting authoritarianism. As critics like Chalmers Johnson and Gore Vidal eloquently argued the besetting sin of the American Republic was empire.
In 2022 SIPRI reported the US’s peer competitor China accounted for 13% of global defence spending (1.6% of GDP or $292bn). Russia followed with 3.9% of global defence spending. The US, China, Russia and India were the greatest defence spenders with US military expenditure substantially outdistancing its rivals. Since 2022 global defence spending has accelerated against the backdrop of what Adam Tooze popularised as a global polycrisis – incommensurate but interconnected and often intractable crises whose backdrop is the hyper-object (Timothy Morton) of climate breakdown. The idea of polycrisis has prompted a wide ranging interdisciplinary debate that has become a touchstone for efforts to illumine our C21st moment. Paths and Bridges has invoked the emergence of a contra-polar world of conflicts between states and powerful Leviathans that are unilaterally challenging the rules and norms of global governance.
III
So paradoxically, Trump’s war – a stunning display of American military power on a basic level – has weakened US power and its global standing overall. In comparison its peer competitor China appears a beacon of sanity and stability. China is reaping geopolitical dividends as the US continues to blunder in the Gulf and Persia.
When Trump insults Europeans allies or dismisses NATO, he warms the heart of the O.G. in the Kremlin whose recent geopolitical course Trump envies. The US’s allies were told they weren’t needed but then Trump appealed for their aid in the US-Israeli war effort including policing the Strait of Hormuz. Yet Trump’s illegal war circumvented Congress and ignored a despised UN while threats to destroy Iran’s civilian infrastructure (like Israel’s scorched policy in Gaza) if followed through would be a war crime.
Trump’s war has weakened his domestic support further. Though Iran is a phobic object for the MAGA base, launching another ‘forever war’ has sharpened divisions among ‘America First’ adherents and GOP supporters who oppose not only foreign wars but foreigners wars. A majority of voters disapprove of the war as perceptions Trump is fighting Netanyahu’s war grow. Trump was again recently forced to deny Israel’s hawkish leader (likely to be politically ousted in Israel before 2026 is out), was setting the war agenda.
Even with a ‘ceasefire’ economic and political turbulence across the world continues because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Asia is most severely hit, heavily dependent on oil and gas and other commodities from the Gulf. South East Asia has driven much global growth in recent decades but now faces surging energy and food costs, cancelled flights (some airlines will go bankrupt) as what Damien Cave (The New York Times 22 April) identified as the three pillars of their highly integrated economies: transport, manufacturing and social mobility (a growing middle class) – come under immense pressure. In recent years global South countries have tried striking a ‘third’ or equidistant course between the superpowers. The growing economic strength of the post-colonial nation-states is reflected in a shift in the centre of gravity of the global system to the south with the ‘provincialisation of Europe’ (Dipesh Chakrabarty) which now extends to North America. These years saw the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) but also countries like Indonesia,Taiwan, Singapore, South Africa, Vietnam, Philippines and others.
Cave notes many of Asia’s most successful export industries require energy inputs from the Gulf but collapsing supply not only chokes off inputs for manufacturing and transport but drives up prices for the remaining supply. Crude oil, LNG, phosphate, urea, helium, ammonia and phosphate are all subject to shortages. The Marxist political economist and blogger Michael Roberts argues stagflation (falling growth and rising prices) could lead to slumpflation. Damage and destruction of oil and gas installations in the Gulf might also push the oil price to $150 dollars per barrel (three times the pre-war price). Already a barrel of crude oil is 50-60% higher than the start of 2026. 11 million barrels of crude oil a day have been lost due to war with 30-40% of Gulf oil and gas installations estimated to have suffered damage. LNG prices have also increased though not as sharply though Paul Krugman thinks further price rises and graver energy shocks are likely.
In their ‘War on Iran’ post (26 March) Kate MacKenzie and Tim Sahay at the Phenomenal World blog discussed the tightening of energy supply in South East Asia where various forms of rationing have been introduced. Philippines with 45 days of fuel left declared a national state of energy emergency. In South Korea TV news anchors removed their jackets and urged viewers to use their A/C units less. Could energy supplies tighten further? MacKenzie and Sahay recall 2022 when the supply of LNG tightened and European countries outbid Bangladesh and Pakistan on the wholesale market literally leaving both countries in the dark. China has banned fuel exports usually destined for Australia, Philippines and Bangladesh. Australian farmers (heavily reliant on diesel) are delaying seeding crops. High end manufacturing of semi-conductors in Taiwan has been hit as Qatari helium supply suffers (a third of the world’s helium). The ripples of supply shock are felt everywhere.
MacKenzie and Sahay argue the energy shock signals a universal dependency on carbon but is also a presentiment of the fossil economy’s mortality in the face of the green revolution. Trumpian governance committed the US (as the world’s largest producer of oil and gas) to enforcing the disciplinary regime of the fossil fuel economy. Having won a second term Trump departed the Paris climate accord again and is opening up the American wilderness to oil and gas exploitation while blocking green energy initiatives. The violent kidnapping of the Maduro’s would help US oil companies gain access to Venezuelan oil Trump claimed. But considerable investment would be required entailing real risks to exploit reserves needing a high level of refining. Given this unattractive prospectus the animal spirits of US oil corporations were barely stirred.
Paul Krugman argues that as with earlier energy shocks demand destruction and diversification are sure to follow as countries pursue energy security, hastening the green energy transition. Even the Gulf states are keen to hitch their wagon to renewables, a real extant revolution led by China busily building an electrostate at a gallop. Trumpian chaos illustrates the danger of over reliance on fossil fuel. Krugman claims oil and gas prices would now be higher but for the initial expectations of a short war. The OECD has downgraded growth forecasts for the G7 economies which will all grow more slowly except the US whose faster growth will rest on oil and gas exports (Iran enjoyed a similar energy boon before the US blockade began). The US is the biggest global oil and gas supplier: 20-22% of world oil and 25% of world gas supply in 2025 surpassing Russia (holder of the greatest natural gas reserves) and Saudi Arabia (the greatest exporter of oil by value given the US consumed most of its own supply). Inflation will rise everywhere including the US though Michael Roberts disputes the OECD’s assumption the US will escape a growth downgrade and points to other analyses projecting lower US growth. Clinging to Pollyannish sentiments are hard when Trump publicly announces domestic price increases are worth the pain while US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent cheerily echoes this message before a G7 audience.
Paul Krugman questions the US economy’s capacity to absorb oil price increases (elasticity). Price rises can be borne for a limited period before GDP starts to decline. In a world where economic growth is the engine of ‘civilization’ – in Trump’s world, this isn’t good news. Rising energy costs across economy and society are effectively a “tax on growth” (Roberts). Krugman argues there is a point when the oil price is so high demand is choked and growth dented. The idea the US economy would escape the turmoil created by Trump’s war was overdone. Indeed like everywhere else US gas pump prices have risen. Fossil energy prices are unlikely to return to their pre-war baseline. By surviving US-Israeli blows, Iran has delivered its own blow to Trump’s credibility and US power.
IV
Trump desperately needs his war to end. Failing to set strategic goals was a characteristic error. After two months the political strains in the US-Israeli coalition were laid bare when Trump lost patience with Netanyahu ordering an end to the bombing of Lebanon. This effectively conceded Iran’s interpretation of the first ceasefire (this ended on 22 April and was extended by Trump indefinitely). This was a humiliation for Netanyahu who has burnt through a lot of political capital and more in terms of Israel’s relations with the outside world. In the US a majority of American adults now hold unfavourable views of Netanyahu and Israel according to the Pew Research Centre (strongest among the young). Similarly 2 to 1 American adults disapprove of the war (more Republicans approve the war than disapprove but the minority is significant) while a majority of adults don’t think the war is going well.
Other political straws in wind underline Trump’s unpopularity. In Europe the political spectrum from left to right is increasingly united in hostility to Trump. Factors feeding the antipathy include US tariffs, threats to seize Greenland and hostility to NATO – all playing poorly with European voters. In contrast a growing band of Sinophiles suggest China – an exemplar of stable governance, driving the clean energy revolution and a technology that it shares with other countries, looks like the future. Though cooler attitudes to China prevail in the developed rich countries than the global South, more favourable attitudes are gaining ground.
US hegemony was derived from a powerful domestic economy able to impose itself globally, an international financial system with the dollar at its heart, parallel institutions of global governance with the US’s imprimatur and an extensive fossil energy economy. Will Trumpian governance diminish or rejuvenate American power? There are many questions and issues but renascence seems unlikely and in our C21st moment; of a global polycrisis, the US adopting the mantle the Great Climate Change Denier, leaves many countries facing an existential choice: stick with geopolitically erratic fossil fuels or adopt renewables and join a green energy revolution that ultimately points to a different civilizational horizon.
This transition is likely to continue to be exceptionally chaotic. Despite climate breakdown reliance on fossil fuels won’t be easily sloughed off in an interdependent globalised economy. Adopting clean energy isn’t a simple either/or binary choice because the modern economy is built around fossil fuels. Even so the clean energy and renewable revolution is an unstoppable global force no matter the fiat of the Caesar who sits in the White House.
Finally, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country (240 million population) and its fourth most powerful economy, a major oil producer and exporter in its own right. Yet the crisis in the Gulf has seen fuel prices spike 50% in the country. The living standards of millions have been tangibly affected and such pain will only increase if conflict continues. Energy shocks, supply chain shortages, the rising cost of living mean increasing levels of social contestation. In many ways Nigeria is typical of the sort of ‘middling power’ or state, that is being exposed by the damaging ripples of Trump’s war. Fifteen years ago the ‘Arab Spring’ erupted across the MENA. The social conflicts and revolutions that ensued had various catalysts – the burden of authoritarianism, high levels of youth unemployment, the role of the internet allowing people to share information and learn what was happening elsewhere but also the rising cost of living including for food and fuel in societies where social inequality was a yawning chasm. We should resist catastrophist perspectives but Trump’s energy shock if it isn’t quickly reined in, has the potential to unfold along paths not dissimilar to the revolutionary wave of the ‘Arab Spring.’
Jules Etjim 17-25 April 2026
